Borussia Dortmund: Formation change the key to saving the season?
Functionality
In Favre’s time at Borussia Dortmund before the aforementioned period, he typically deployed the squad in a 4-2-3-1 formation. Due to injuries, stale tactics, or a simple desire for reinvention, the manager switched over to a 3-4-3, featuring a two man pivot in midfield and wing-backs working box to box.
The most notable change in this formation is the loss of a midfielder in exchange for a third defender, in this case Thomas Delaney or Julian Weigl taking the hook for the sake of the talented Dan-Axel Zagadou. It has also seen an out of form Nico Schulz get replaced by Raphael Guerreiro.
The former swap is intended to shift the ball winning responsibility away from midfield players, who can also press higher with the guarantee of a reserved anchor ready to step out from the back line in the form of Mats Hummels. The exchange of Schulz for Guerreiro is intended to allow for more fluid ball progression up the flanks; the Portugese is the more proficient ball handler of the two left-backs.
The shift of ball progression is important. Observers will have noted that since the formation shift, Mats Hummels has taken a more prominent role in distribution; he routinely launches 30 yard passes over the heads of opposition wingers to the waiting wingbacks. Brandt and his partner in midfield will then check in to that side, and quick interplay will begin that intends to overload one side of the opposition defense. This tactic is effective because Favre has chosen to play both wide midfielders and forwards who can work together to break down a defensive unit and get in behind by creating a numerical advantage in a small area.
This signifies a more direct approach to attacking than utilized previously, removing depth from the midfield in exchange for the ability to create space on the wings. There will be less switching the play and slowly breaking down a defense and more fast paced exchanges that rely on flair and technical ability.
The front three is largely unaffected by this upheaval. The wingers, given the benefit of wide support, will drift inside to goal scoring positions as their wingbacks fly up the line, and the centre forward/false nine will often drop deeper to give support to the seemingly understaffed two man midfield. Dortmund’s current front line is well suited to this.
Additionally, tenacious wingbacks have a tendency to pin back opposition wingers in defense if they are playing a four at the back, and this reduces the potency of counterattacks. However, when a fast break does occur and the first line is broken, it means trouble for the larger, slower central defenders who are left stranded in space.
In defence, this formation is suited to a block (as opposed to high pressing), with five bodies back increasing both the depth and width of the defensive line. Without a ball winning central mid, the press is debilitated after the first line of attackers is broken. A five at the back is known as a less entertaining but more effective defensive method, and could be a much needed change for a porous Dortmund defense.